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country.  Results: Overall, irrational beliefs were positively as-
sociated with various types of distress, such as general dis-
tress, anxiety, depression, anger, and guilt (omnibus: r = 
0.38). The following variables were significant moderators of 
the relationship between the intensity of irrational beliefs 
and the level of distress: irrational belief measure and type, 
stressful event, age, educational and clinical status, and de-
veloper/validator status of the author.  Conclusions: Irratio-
nal beliefs and distress are moderately connected to each 
other; this relationship remains significant even after con-
trolling for several potential covariates. 
 © 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Given the high prevalence of mental disorders in the 
population and the considerable economic burden asso-
ciated, it is imperative to disseminate effective treatments 
that have enduring effects for patients over time  [1] . 
However, in order to establish and disseminate psycho-
therapeutic treatments, there is not only a claim to inves-
tigate their efficacy/effectiveness, but also a demand for a 
clear understanding of their underlying theory and psy-
 Key Words 
 Irrational beliefs · Meta-analysis · Psychological distress  
 Abstract 
 Background: Since the cognitive revolution of the early 
1950s, cognitions have been discussed as central compo-
nents in the understanding and treatment of mental illness-
es. Even though there is an extensive literature on the asso-
ciation between therapy-related cognitions such as irratio-
nal beliefs and psychological distress over the past 60 years, 
there is little meta-analytical knowledge about the nature of 
this association.  Methods: The relationship between irratio-
nal beliefs and distress was examined based on a systematic 
review that included 100 independent samples, gathered in 
83 primary studies, using a random-effect model. The overall 
effects as well as potential moderators were examined: (a) 
distress measure, (b) irrational belief measure, (c) irrational 
belief type, (d) method of assessment of distress, (e) nature 
of irrational beliefs, (f) time lag between irrational beliefs and 
distress assessment, (g) nature of stressful events, (h) sample 
characteristics (i.e. age, gender, income, and educational, 
marital, occupational and clinical status), (i) developer/vali-
dator status of the author(s), and (k) publication year and 
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chological mechanisms  [2, 3] . Therefore, investigating 
how fundamental psychological mechanisms postulated 
to produce change in these treatments relate to psycho-
logical distress becomes a necessary step towards validat-
ing these treatments. 
 Irrational beliefs are lasting constructs used over the 
past decades and co-developed in the Rational Emotive 
Behavior Therapy (REBT), an early cognitive-behavior-
al framework for the treatment of mental disorders  [4] . 
After initially proposing 11 irrational or evaluative belief 
types  [5] , subsequent developments in REBT  [6] as-
signed these types of irrational beliefs to four catego-
ries: demandingness (i.e. absolutistic/inflexible require-
ments), awfulizing (or catastrophizing), frustration 
 intolerance (or low frustration tolerance) and global 
evaluation of one’s own person (self-downing), other 
persons (other-downing) and/or the life situation (life-
downing). In stressful activating situations, irrational 
beliefs are hypothesized to engender dysfunctional emo-
tions  [7] . Another main approach in clinical psychology 
focuses on the role of automatic thoughts and cognitive 
schemas (or representations) in generating distress  [8] . 
It has been shown that while representations contribute 
to emotion, only evaluations (i.e. how relevant the event 
is for the individual) have a direct impact on emotional 
response  [9, 10] . 
 Over the years, many studies investigated REBT and 
helped to refine the theory and practice of REBT based 
on a large number of diverse narrative reviews of em-
pirical research  [11, 12] . However, thus far, the quantita-
tive findings associated with these reviews have not been 
summarized using meta-analytic methods. Thus, the 
major aim of the present investigation was to examine 
the quantitative findings regarding the correlational re-
lationship between irrational beliefs and various types of 
psychological distress using meta-analytic methods. 
Furthermore, we aimed to investigate the role of the fol-
lowing variables as potential moderators of the relation-
ship between the level of irrational beliefs and the inten-
sity of psychological distress: (a) distress measure; (b) 
irrational belief measure; (c) irrational belief type; (d) 
method of assessment of distress (i.e. self-report vs. ob-
server report); (e) nature of irrational beliefs (i.e. gen-
eral vs. specific, and naturally varying vs. manipulated); 
(f) time lag between irrational beliefs and distress assess-
ment; (g) nature of stressful events (i.e. present vs. ab-
sent, real/naturalistic vs. experimentally induced, per-
sonally relevant vs. not personally relevant); (h) sample 
characteristics (e.g. age, gender, income, and education-
al, marital, occupational and clinical status); (i) devel-
oper/validator status of the author(s), and (k) publica-
tion year and country.
 We expect distinct patterns of association between 
irrational beliefs and distress, considering that some dis-
tress measures contain mostly emotional items, while 
others contain a mixture of emotional, behavioral and 
somatic items  [13] . Second, we expect to obtain a sig-
nificantly stronger irrational belief-distress relationship 
when irrational beliefs were measured using scales that 
contain emotional items (e.g. the Irrational Beliefs Test, 
IBT  [14] ), as opposed to newer scales containing only 
cognitive items (e.g. the Survey of Personal Beliefs, SPB 
 [15] ; the Attitude and Belief Scale, ABS  [16] , and the Ir-
rational Belief Scale, IBS  [17] ). In addition, reliability 
indices of the different measures might also impact this 
relationship  [18] . Third, we expect that the various ir-
rational belief types (e.g. demandingness and awfuliz-
ing) would show significantly different associations with 
different types of psychological distress (e.g. anxiety and 
depression  [19] ). Fourth, we expect that the strength of 
the irrational belief-distress association will differ de-
pending on the observational perspective (i.e. self-re-
port vs. clinician report  [20] ). Fifth, we expect signifi-
cant differences in the irrational belief-distress associa-
tion depending on whether general versus specific 
irrational beliefs were measured  [21] . Sixth, we expect 
the association between irrational beliefs and distress 
would be significantly stronger in studies where irratio-
nal beliefs were not only measured occurring naturally 
but also manipulated experimentally (e.g. instructions 
to repeat irrational beliefs  [22] , and randomized clinical 
trials that included REBT as a treatment group and mea-
sured irrational beliefs as a central mechanism of change 
 [23] ). Seventh, we expect the irrational belief-distress as-
sociation will significantly differ depending on the time 
lag between the measurement of the two constructs  [21] . 
Moreover, the association between irrational beliefs and 
distress may vary depending on the level of stress poten-
tially being induced by particular events  [7] ; it is as-
sumed that the level of induced stress may also be max-
imal when the stress is real and personally relevant  [7, 
24] . The strength of the irrational belief-distress asso-
ciation may also vary depending on characteristics of 
specific samples (e.g. participants’ age  [25] ). Research-
ers’ conflicts of interest may systematically impact the 
(predictive) validity of irrational beliefs, i.e. developers 
or validators of a particular irrational belief measure 
may be more motivated to demonstrate a high predic-
tive validity of the measure examined. When (i.e. publi-
cation year) and where (i.e. publication country) a re-
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spective study was conducted may also influence the re-
lationship between irrational beliefs and psychological 
distress  [26] .
 Methods 
 Selection of Studies 
 Potentially relevant studies were queried in the PsycINFO and 
Medline databases for all years covered through April 2014. We 
used the following search terms: ‘irrational beliefs’, ‘distress’, ‘neg-
ative feelings’, ‘negative emotions’, ‘anxiety’, ‘depression’, ‘anger’ 
and ‘guilt’. We also examined the reference sections of all articles 
included. The search procedure led to the identification of 182 re-
cords (online suppl. fig. 1; for all online suppl. material, see www.
karger.com/doi/10.1159/000441231). After removing duplicates, 
the remaining studies were analyzed in detail for relevance based 
on their abstract. Following the exclusion of irrelevant publica-
tions (i.e. the screened abstracts indicated that either irrational be-
liefs or distress were not measured, irrational beliefs were not mea-
sured according to the REBT theory, or the authors did not com-
pute an association between irrational beliefs and distress), a total 
of 89 potentially relevant articles were inspected for relevance 
based on their full text. Only studies that fulfilled the following 
criteria were included: (a) assessed irrational beliefs according to 
the REBT theory; (b) assessed at least one type of psychological 
distress (e.g. general distress and anxiety), and (c) reported a nu-
merical relationship between irrational beliefs and distress that 
was amenable to meta-analytic methods. Eighty-three articles were 
included for analyses (online suppl. fig. 1).
 Coding of Studies 
 The authors created a coding system based on the theoretical 
conceptualization of irrational beliefs and psychological distress 
(online suppl. table 1). All articles were coded by the first author; in 
addition, a random sample of 10 studies was coded by a research 
assistant. The interrater agreement was high (r  ≥ 0.95 for categorical 
variables and r  ≥ 0.99 for continuous variables). The few cases with 
diverging assessments were discussed until a consensus was reached.
 Meta-Analytic Procedures 
 The correlation coefficient, r ,  was the measure of choice to as-
sess the effect size for most analyses. We used only one effect size 
from each study for each analysis  [27] , and we randomly selected 
one within-study level for each categorical moderator to base our 
analyses on a fully independent sample  [28] . All computations 
were performed on the basis of Fisher’s z  transformation of r  be-
fore the sample effect sizes were included in our meta-analysis 
 [29] . The weighted mean effect sizes were converted back to r  for 
interpretive purposes. When interpreting the magnitude of r, we 
adopted Cohen’s  [30] guidelines: r  values of 0.10, 0.30 and 0.50 
indicate small, medium and large effect sizes, respectively. In the 
effect size analyses, we used a random-effect model. All analyses 
were conducted using the R statistical software package for meta-
analysis ‘MAc’  [29] and ‘metafor’  [31] . Heterogeneity was assessed 
using the Q and I 2 statistics  [32] . To identify publication bias, 
asymmetry was tested based on rank correlation  [33] and regres-
sion tests  [34] . Furthermore, a funnel plot was examined using 
trim and fill procedures  [35] .
 Results 
 Descriptive Characteristics 
 Participant and Study Characteristics 
 The total number of participants across all 83 studies 
comprising 100 different samples was 16,110. The weight-
ed mean age by sample size was 29.4 years (SD = 10.45; 
range = 12.5–72.5 years). Sixty-six samples were com-
posed of student populations and 34 samples were com-
posed of populations other than high-school or college 
students. Twenty-two were clinical samples, and 78 were 
subclinical or nonclinical samples. The included studies 
were published between 1972 and 2014. They were con-
ducted in 13 different countries; the first 3 places were 
occupied by the United States, Romania, and the United 
Kingdom. Irrational beliefs were manipulated before be-
ing measured in only 5 samples. In only 17 samples, a 
stressful event was present.
 Irrational Belief and Psychological Distress Measures 
 The most frequently used irrational belief measures 
were the IBT  [14] (k = 23), SPB  [15] (k =  18), IBS  [17] 
(k = 15) and ABS  [16] (k =  15). The most frequently used 
measures for psychological distress were the Beck De-
pression Inventory  [36] (k = 25), the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory  [37] (k = 21), the Profile of Mood States  [38] 
(k = 10), and a single item rating (i.e. emotional items 
rated on a Likert scale; e.g. anxiety and depression; k = 8). 
 Irrational Belief and Psychological Distress Types 
 Irrational belief types were measured as follows: de-
mandingness was measured in 40 samples, awfulizing/
catastrophizing in 22 samples, frustration intolerance/
low frustration tolerance in 24 samples and global evalu-
ation in 22 samples. The psychological distress types were 
measured as follows: general distress was measured in 26 
samples, depression in 47, anxiety in 44, anger in 17, and 
guilt in 6.
 Relationship between Irrational Beliefs and Overall 
Psychological Distress 
 The overall effect of the unconditional model analysis 
(k = 100) was r  = 0.38 (95% CI = 0.34–0.42). There was 
significant heterogeneity in the effect sizes (Q = 904.88, 
p < 0.001; I 2 = 89%, 95% CI = 0.34–0.42). Significance 
tests of asymmetry indicated that publication bias was not 
present in the included studies (p > 0.22). The trim and 
fill procedure  [34] estimated that the number of missing 
studies needed to attain complete symmetry was one; the 
imputed study is depicted in the online supplementary 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
ts
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 B
er
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
19
8.
14
3.
58
.1
 - 
1/
8/
20
16
 3
:3
5:
21
 P
M
 Irrational Beliefs and Psychological 
Distress 
 Psychother Psychosom 2016;85:8–15 
DOI: 10.1159/000441231
11
figure 2. The distress measure was not a significant mod-
erator of the relationship between irrational beliefs and 
psychological distress on the overall sample (p > 0.05). 
 Relationship between Irrational Beliefs and 
Psychological Distress Types 
 The relationship between irrational beliefs and each 
distress type reached statistical significance, with anxiety 
showing the highest association ( table 1 ). Moreover, there 
was significant heterogeneity for each distress type. 
Therefore, we tested potential moderators for each dis-
tress type.
 Moderation Analyses within Distress Types 
 Irrational belief measure moderated the association 
between irrational beliefs and depression as well as the 
association between irrational beliefs and anxiety (p < 
0.05), with some measures (e.g. IBT and ABS) showing 
significantly higher associations than other measures 
(e.g. SPB;  table 2 ). For an analysis of direct contrast of 
measures in anxiety and depression, see online supple-
mentary table 2. The type of irrational beliefs was not a 
significant moderator of the irrational belief-distress as-
sociation for depression and anxiety (p > 0.05). However, 
due to the observed variation  among the irrational belief-
distress association for different irrational belief types 
(with frustration intolerance showing the highest associa-
tion), we computed an exploratory analysis contrasting 
frustration intolerance and all other irrational belief types 
for each psychological distress type. We obtained a sig-
nificant moderation effect for frustration intolerance ver-
sus all other irrational belief types in depression, anxiety, 
anger, and guilt (p < 0.05), but not in general distress 
(p > 0.05). As shown in  table 2 , the relationship between 
frustration intolerance and distress was significantly 
higher than the relationship between all other irrational 
belief types combined and distress. 
 Regarding stressful events, we obtained significant re-
sults in the case of depression (p < 0.05); the association 
between irrational beliefs and depression was higher 
when a stressful event was present (r = 0.67, p < 0.001, 
k = 2) versus when not (r = 0.30, p < 0.001, k = 42;  table 2 ). 
We also obtained a significant result for general distress 
(p < 0.05); a higher association between irrational beliefs 
and general distress was reported when the stressful event 
was experimentally induced (r = 0.55, p < 0.001, k = 2) 
versus when the stressful event was real/naturalistic (r = 
0.32, p < 0.001, k = 7). We did not obtain a significant 
moderation effect for the personal relevance of the stress-
ful event for either anxiety or depression (p > 0.05). Age 
was a significant moderator of the relationship between 
irrational beliefs and anger; specifically, for every unit in-
crease in age, there was a 0.04 increase in the association 
between irrational beliefs and anger (p < 0.05). Educa-
tional status was also a significant moderator of the asso-
ciation between irrational beliefs and distress in general 
distress and anger (p < 0.05); the association with both 
general distress and anger was significantly smaller in stu-
dents (r = 0.30, p < 0.001, k = 16 for general distress; r = 
0.19, p < 0.001, k = 14 for anger) compared with subjects 
in nonuniversity samples (r = 0.46, p < 0.001, k = 10 for 
general distress; r = 0.52, p < 0.001, k = 3 for anger). We 
did not obtain significant results for depression or anxiety 
(p > 0.05). The clinical status of the participants was a 
moderator of the association between irrational beliefs 
and anger (p < 0.05); the association was higher in clinical 
samples (r = 0.54, p < 0.001, k = 3) compared with non-
clinical samples (r = 0.21, p < 0.001, k = 14). However, 
clinical status was not a significant moderator in general 
distress, depression or anxiety (p > 0.05). 
 The developer/validator status of the author(s) was a 
significant moderator in depression and anger (p < 0.05; 
 table 2 ). Notably, the association between irrational be-
liefs and depression was significantly smaller when any of 
the authors were a developer/validator (r = 0.22, p < 0.001, 
k = 15) versus when none of the authors were a developer/
validator (r = 0.38, p < 0.001, k = 32). Similarly, the asso-
ciation between irrational beliefs and anger was signifi-
cantly smaller when an author was a developer/validator 
(r = 0.15, p < 0.05, k = 7) versus when not (r = 0.33, p < 
0.001, k = 10). The developer/validator status of the 
author(s) did not moderate the association between irra-
tional beliefs and psychological distress for either general 
distress or anxiety (p > 0.05). As can be observed in  ta-
ble 2 , we did not obtain significant results for the follow-
 Table 1. Overall effect sizes for different psychological distress 
types
Distress type k n r 95% CI Q I2
General 
distress 26 4,290 0.36** 0.27, 0.44 243.2** 89%
Depression 47 8,278 0.33** 0.26, 0.39 463.06** 90%
Anxiety 44 5,911 0.41** 0.31, 0.5 752.99** 94%
Anger 17 3,046 0.25** 0.17, 0.32 72.86** 76%
Guilt 6 1,270 0.29* 0.02, 0.52 122.15** 95%
k is the number of effect sizes included in each analysis. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.001.
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 Table 2.  Moderation analyses within distress types
Distress types
general distress depression anxiety anger  guilt
Moderators Qb (d.f.) k r Qb (d.f.) k r Qb (d.f.) k r Qb (d.f.) k r Q b (d.f.) k r
Irrational belief measure 1.13 (4) 16.36 (4)* 12.38 (4)* – –
IBT 2 0.50* 10 0.46** 12 0.50**
IBS 5 0.30* 7 0.41** 7 0.45**
ABS 6 0.40** 6 0.45** 3 0.73**
SPB 4 0.37* 11 0.17* 9 0.28*
Others 9 0.33** 13 0.25** 13 0.29*
Irrational belief type – 5.81 (3) 0.54 (3) – –
DEM 8 0.19** 9 0.32*
AFW/CAT 7 0.20** 2 0.30 
FI/LFT 4 0.39** 7 0.40*
GE 6 0.20* 2 0.24 
FI/LFT vs. other 1.67 (1) 4.48 (1)* 3.97 (1)* 3.89 (1)* 6.37 (1)*
FI/LFT 4 0.43** 6 0.38** 9 0.47** 5 0.30** 3 0.36**
Other IB types1 5 0.28** 19 0.22** 11 0.24* 8 0.16** 3 0.00
Distress reporting – 0.69 (1) – – –
Self-reported distress 44 0.32**
Observer-reported distress 3 0.43*
Irrational belief specificity 0.65 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.26 (1) – –
General irrational belief 21 0.34** 45 0.33** 42 0.42**
Specific irrational belief 5 0.43** 2 0.33 2 0.29
Irrational belief 2.91 (1) – 0.04 (1) – –
Measured 24 0.34** 42 0.41**
Manipulated 2 0.61** 2 0.36
Time lag 0.58 (1) 1.40 (1) 0.03 (1) 0.00 (1) –
Same time 23 0.35** 42 0.34** 41 0.41** 15 0.25**
Different time 3 0.45 2 0.11 3 0.44* 2 0.25
Stressful events
(A) Present vs. absent 0.14 (1) 7.87 (1)* 1.67 (1) 3.17 (1) –
Present 9 0.38** 2 0.67** 8 0.54** 3 0.41**
Absent 17 0.35** 42 0.30** 36 0.38** 14 0.22**
(B) Real vs. experimental 4.77 (1)* – 0.42 (1) – –
Real 7 0.32** 3 0.59**
Experimentally induced 2 0.55** 5 0.49**
(C) Personally relevant vs. not – 0.22 (1) 1.002 (1) – –
Relevant 6 0.43* 6 0.56**
Not relevant 2 0.26 4 0.39*
Age 1.12 (1) 0.008 (1) 0.10 (1) 4.57 (1)* –
Gender 0.35 (1) 0.11 (1) 0.0008 (1) 2.10 (1) –
Clinical status 0.29 (1) 0.1 (1) 0.52 (1) 10.62 (1)* –
Clinical 5 0.41** 12 0.35** 10 0.47** 3 0.54**
Non(sub)clinical 21 0.35** 35 0.32** 34 0.39** 14 0.21**
Developer/validator 0.96 (1) 5.97 (1)* 0.91 (1) 6.01 (1)* –
Yes 10 0.31** 15 0.22** 14 0.34** 7 0.15*
No 16 0.40** 32 0.38** 30 0.44** 10 0.33**
Publication year 1.13 (1) 2.97 (1) 0.22 (1) 0.07 (1) –
Country 0.05 (1) 3.05 (1) 0.13 (1) 2.54 (1) –
US 10 0.35** 26 0.38** 29 0.42** 12 0.21**
Other countries 16 0.37** 18 0.25** 15 0.39** 5 0.43**
k is the number of effect sizes included in each analysis. Others = Other instruments used to measure irrational beliefs beside the core ones; DEM = de-
mandingness; AWF/CAT = awfulizing/catastrophizing; FI/LFT = frustration intolerance/low frustration tolerance; GE = global evaluation. 1 Demandingness, 
awfulizing/catastrophizing, and global evaluation. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001.
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ing proposed moderators: self-reported versus observer-
reported distress, general/core versus specific irrational 
beliefs, naturally varying versus manipulated irrational 
beliefs, time lag between irrational beliefs and distress as-
sessment, gender, publication year and publication coun-
try (p > 0.05).
 Discussion 
 The present meta-analysis empirically tested the asso-
ciation between irrational beliefs and psychological dis-
tress. The study was based on 100 independent samples 
of 83 primary studies being conducted in 13 different 
countries over the last 60 years. Overall, our results cor-
roborate a moderate (overall r = 0.38) but robust relation-
ship between psychological distress and irrational beliefs. 
Some authors  [39, 40] have warned against conducting 
meta-analyses that include highly heterogeneous popula-
tions. Despite including heterogeneous studies reflecting 
different populations with the aim of avoiding data frag-
mentation, the present meta-analysis also reported over-
all effects for the association with different emotional dis-
turbances and conducted moderation analyses within 
these specific categories. The following variables were sig-
nificant moderators of the relationship between irrational 
beliefs and different types of psychological distress: the 
irrational belief measure chosen in a particular study, ir-
rational belief types (specifically frustration intolerance), 
stressful events providing the context of assessment, age, 
educational status, clinical status, and the developer/vali-
dator status of the author.
 The distress measure did not significantly moderate 
the association between irrational beliefs and psychologi-
cal distress. Nonetheless, when split into the various types 
of distress, the irrational belief measure was a moderator 
for depression and anxiety. These results may be explained 
by comparing scales that contain affect-related items (e.g. 
IBT) with scales that do not (e.g. IBS, ABS and SPB), the 
items of which may artificially inflate the correlation be-
tween irrational beliefs and distress  [41] . In the same time, 
these results could also be attributed to high reliabilities of 
the used measures  [18] . In contrast to the chosen mea-
sures, the type of irrational beliefs being assessed did not 
generally moderate the association between irrational be-
liefs and psychological distress significantly. These results 
might suggest that irrational beliefs work as a transdiag-
nostic vulnerability and/or for some of them the self-re-
port measures might not be sensitive enough (e.g. de-
mandingness  [24] ). However, frustration intolerance 
emerged to have a significantly higher correlation with all 
distress types than all other irrational belief types taken 
together. Further research is needed to clarify the ‘micro-
structure’ of this association, i.e. the associations of spe-
cific areas of frustration intolerance with certain distress-
ing problems  [42] . Overall, these findings are unexpected, 
given that demandingness was postulated as the core ir-
rational belief in Ellis’ theory  [7] that leads to the arousal 
of the other three (i.e. awfulizing, frustration intolerance, 
and global evaluation). Therefore, either the centrality of 
demandingness is retired as a viable hypothesis, or new 
methods to assess demandingness as part of a tacit/im-
plicit process need to be developed in future research  [24] .
 Regarding stressful events providing the context for 
assessment, we obtained significant results for depression 
and general distress. Whereas the association between ir-
rational beliefs and depression was higher when a stress-
ful event was present versus absent, a higher association 
between irrational beliefs and general distress was report-
ed when the stressful event was experimentally induced 
versus real/naturalistic. The latter finding was unexpect-
ed and may be explained by the novelty of the experimen-
tally induced stressful event, which can potentially in-
crease the reported level of distress. Several sample char-
acteristics emerged as significant moderators of the 
irrational belief-distress association: the association be-
tween irrational beliefs and anger increases with age, it 
was higher in clinical versus nonclinical samples, and the 
association with anger and general distress was smaller in 
students versus nonuniversity samples. Each of these as-
sociations needs to be replicated in larger samples before 
further speculation about potential moderators.
 There was no indication of publication bias, neither in 
the overall sample nor in subsamples. In contrast to our 
hypothesis, the correlation between irrational beliefs and 
psychological distress was even smaller in studies con-
ducted by researchers who were developers/validators of 
an irrational belief scale compared with studies con-
ducted by nondevelopers/nonvalidators. This somewhat 
counterintuitive result may be explained by developers’ 
stricter adherence to scientific standards. It might be that 
developers/validators of an irrational belief instrument 
want to counter suspicions raised by what their develop-
ers/validators status might imply. At the same time, a sig-
nificantly smaller association between irrational beliefs 
and psychological distress in studies conducted by re-
searchers who were developers/validators of an irrational 
belief scale compared with studies conducted by nonde-
velopers/nonvalidators might be an indicator of research-
ers’ increased investment in the development of measures 
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of irrational beliefs that are minimally ‘contaminated’ by 
emotional items.
 Several limitations emerged in the present meta-anal-
ysis. First, despite the sporadic experimental evidence in-
cluded in this meta-analysis, the presented research does 
not allow for drawing strong conclusions regarding the 
causality of the relationship between irrational beliefs and 
psychological distress. Irrational beliefs were manipulat-
ed before being measured in only 5 samples. As a conse-
quence, future research will need to conduct longitudinal 
analyses which will allow for a better understanding of the 
potentially etiopathogenetic nature of irrational beliefs 
 [24] . Second, the studies included in the meta-analysis 
were conducted predominantly in a Western cultural 
context. Therefore, future studies will need to test wheth-
er these results are also applicable to other cultural con-
texts. Third, nearly all studies included in the meta-anal-
ysis employed self-reported measures of the constructs; 
future research may benefit by including measures based 
on observer ratings and diagnostic interviews to further 
control for possible self-report biases. Fourth, most stud-
ies were conducted in subclinical or nonclinical samples. 
Fifth, this meta-analysis was focused on the associations 
between irrational beliefs and psychological distress (in 
our sample, we found a k of 5 studies that also reported 
an association between rational beliefs and psychological 
distress) and therefore excluded rational belief scales/
subscales. Rational beliefs were originally conceptualized 
as low scores on irrational belief measures. Chronologi-
cally, scales that measure rational beliefs were developed 
later; therefore, the available number of studies does not 
yet allow for meta-analytic analyses. 
 The results of the present meta-analytic review [ref.  15 , 
 17 ,  19–23 ,  25 ,  26 ,  41 have been included in the meta-anal-
ysis] have implications for future research. Future studies 
may invest in constructing new methods for the assess-
ment of demandingness as a tacit/implicit process, may 
investigate how specific components of frustration intol-
erance relate to certain distressing problems, may con-
duct more experimental studies that induce a (relevant) 
stressful event and/or manipulate irrational beliefs, and 
may conduct longitudinal analyses, which will allow for a 
better understanding of the potentially etiopathogenetic 
nature of irrational beliefs. Moreover, future research 
should be conducted in different cultural contexts on dif-
ferent clinical samples and should measure more specific 
irrational beliefs (e.g. cancer-related irrational beliefs). 
Finally, future research will need to systematically inte-
grate other potentially relevant variables that may moder-
ate the relationship between irrational beliefs and psycho-
logical distress, such as marital status, occupational sta-
tus, and income of participants.
 To conclude, this comprehensive meta-analysis inves-
tigated the robustness of the association between irratio-
nal beliefs and various types of psychological distress: a 
test of one of the major basic associations in modern psy-
chology since the cognitive revolution  [2, 3] . The results 
show that the overall strength of the relationship between 
irrational beliefs and psychological distress is modest; 
however, this relationship holds across different samples, 
measurements, and study design.
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